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As a response to the divide in International Law between civil and political rights and social 
and economic rights, the United Nations in June 2008 adopted the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights which for the first time allows 
for an international forum to determine breaches of social and economic rights within domestic 
systems. The task of bringing such an optional protocol to fruition was one fraught with 
opposition, particularly from states who grant little or no judicial protection to social and 
economic rights. Ireland is one of those states where the fight to judicially protect social and 
economic rights has been met with fierce resistance. Having now signed the Optional Protocol, 
will this make any difference to the domestic regime in Ireland? 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
came into force on 5th May 2013. This protocol attempts to elevate social and economic rights 
within International Law by establishing an international forum where violations of such rights 
may be adjudicated upon. However given the historical development of social and economic 
rights both internationally and within Ireland, will this protocol have any real effect on the 
justiciability of social and economic rights in Ireland? 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS  
Following World War II there was impetus on the International Community to codify Human 
Rights. The barbarism inflicted upon victims of the Nazi Regime resulted in the International 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg to prosecute those responsible. Shattuck comments on the 
irony that the place most associated with Nazi Germany would become the birthplace for the 
human rights movement.1  Justice Jackson’s opening speech in November 1945 declared that 
“the wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant and 
so devastating that civilisation cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive 
their being repeated”.2 On 9th December 1948 the Tribunal collectively declared “Never Again” 
and the next day on the 10th December 1948 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 speaks in its preamble of the dignity and 
worth of the human person and encourages that human rights should be protected by the rule 
of law. The Declaration does not make any distinction between civil and political rights and 
social and economic rights. The right to social security3, the right to rest and leisure,4 the right 
                                                          
1 John Shattuck, The Legacy of Nuremberg: Confronting Genocide and Terrorism Through The Rule of Law, 
Gonzaga Journal of International Law, Vol 10.1 2006 
2 November 21st 1945, Robert H Jackson’s opening statement to the IMT Nuremberg. Full text of the speech can 
be found at www.roberthjackson.org/speeches 
3 Art 22 of UDHR “Everyone as members of society has the right to social security and is entitled to realisation 
through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organisation and resources of 
each state, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensible for his dignity..”  
4 Art 24 of UDHR “ everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitations of working hours 
with periodic holiday with pay”. 
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to an adequate standard of living,5 sit side by side with the classic civil and political rights such 
as the freedom from torture contained within Article 5 and the right to a fair trial contained 
within Article 10. This is evidence that at the commencement of the human rights movement 
social and economic rights were recognised as being equally as important as civil and political 
rights and that the International Community did not consider any divide between them.  
Brodsky and Day use this as their starting point to argue that international law does not support 
a division of the rights and such division is based in national law perspectives which cling to a 
negative model of human rights.6  
Unfortunately the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not a legally binding document 
and was merely a guide which State’s have regard to when implementing their national law 
provisions, it did not require that any of the rights contained therein actually be transposed into 
national law.  
The divide between the categories of rights came to the forefront during the transposition of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into legally enforceable Covenants. Despite the 
official position that the two sets of rights are universal, interdependent, interrelated and 
indivisible,7 Steiner and Alston observe that there was a deep disagreement regarding the 
proper status of social and economic rights which were both extreme views.8 One side of the 
argument believe that the social and economic rights are superior to civil and political rights in 
chronological terms, meaning that without the fulfilment of social and economic rights the civil 
and political rights cannot be realised.9 The other side of the argument states that social and 
economic rights are not rights in the traditional and classic sense of the term rights and to treat 
them as such undermines individual freedoms and distorts the free market. 
Negotiations began in 1949 to transpose the rights contained within the UDHR into legally 
binding treaty obligations, and the negotiations concluded in 1966. One of the reasons for the 
delay was this debate over the status of social and economic rights which are in some way a 
                                                          
5  Art 25 (1) “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and 
of his family including food, clothing, housing and medical care an necessary social services..” Art 25(2) 
“motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance”. 
6 Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day, Beyond the Social and Economic Rights Debate: Substantive Equality 
Speaks to Poverty, CJWL, Vol 14 2002 
7 Vienna Declaration, para 5, 1993 second World Conference on Human Rights 
8 Henry Steiner, Ryan Goodman and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context; Law Politics 
Morals, 3rd Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007 p 263 
9 Examples of such given by Steiner and Alston include: what use is free speech to the starving and illiterate and 
that the homeless cannot register to vote. Op cit at 8 
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casualty of the cold war. The western states, led by America were opposed to their inclusion 
and expressed concern over the scope of the obligations while many eastern nations strongly 
advocated for the inclusion of these rights. When drafting began it was initially the position 
that all of the rights contained within the UDHR would be transposed into one Treaty which 
had legal enforceability. However in 1951 the General Assembly agreed to draft two separate 
covenants following pressure from the Western dominated Commission.10 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights were adopted by the General Assembly and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession on 16th December 1966.11 
The difference between the two Covenants could not be starker. The ICCPR places obligations 
on states to safeguard the rights contained therein and creates a legal obligation between states 
and also between a state and its citizen. The original draft of the ICCPR included a mechanism 
whereby states could bring a petition against other states, and the optional protocol made it 
possible for individuals to bring a petition against states. The petition is taken to the United 
Nations Human Rights Commission against states who have ratified the optional protocol12. 
However, the UNHRC is mainly a reporting and advisory body as has no powers to enforce 
judgements against states. This position was further clarified in Ahani v Canada (Attorney 
General) where the Commission stated that it could only give its views on human rights matters 
and such views are not binding.13 Raluca is highly critical of the petition system for the ICCPR 
in that it is only available to individuals where their home state has ratified the optional 
protocol, the decisions are not binding and there is an option to opt out of the optional protocol 
at any time leaving the Committee with limited jurisdiction.14 
While Raluca’s criticism is well founded, there was at least the inclusion a forum in which 
violations of the ICCPR can be heard and as such recognition of the need for international 
protection where domestic protection failed. In contrast the ICESCR contained no provisions 
for state or individual petitions for violations of the rights therein, nor does place a legal 
obligation on states to ensure fulfilment of the rights. The rights, according to the Covenant are 
                                                          
10 UN Doc A2929 (1955) at 7 
11 UN Resolution 2200A (XXI). The ICESCR entered into force on the 3rd January 1976 and the ICCPR entered 
into force on 23rd March 1976 
12 ICCPR Optional Protocol G.A Res 2200A (XXI) 21 UN GAOR Supp (No. 16) at 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966) 
U.N.T.S 3 
13 (2002) 58 O.R (3d) 107 at 32 
14 David, Raluca, Comparative Study of Three International Human Rights Systems and Their Enforcement 
Mechanisms (December 11, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1566495v 
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to be recognised subject to the availability of resources and rather than an immediate obligation 
to ensure rights, this category of rights are to be progressively realised.15 The Covenant does 
not elaborate on what steps should be taken or what portion of resources should be used to 
fulfil these rights. Steiner and Alston comment that the Covenant imposes a “programmatic” 
obligation on states in that the obligation is fulfilled if a programme is in place.16 
The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights was established in 1985 to carry out 
the function of monitoring compliance with the Covenant.17 States are obliged to provide 
reports to the Committee at regular intervals who in turn report on the state’s progress on 
implementation and fulfilment of social and economic rights. The Committee can make 
recommendations and criticisms of states, but has no power to compel compliance as their 
reports are non binding in nature. The Committee has also been active in producing General 
Comments which clarify the contents of rights contained within the ICESCR and direct how 
the rights should be interpreted and which recommend the minimum core of the right which 
every state is encouraged to implement.18 These general comments again are of a non binding 
nature and do not create a legally enforceable right, they are merely an authoritative 
interpretation of the rights contained within Convention. They set out the obligations on the 
State and what steps should be taken in order to ensure that they respect, protect and fulfil the 
rights. However given that the ICESCR is a Convention which contains rights which are to be 
progressively realised, the general comments are of limited use unless the right is contained 
elsewhere in a legally binding treaty.19 They are published with a view to assisting state’s in 
implementing the Convention.  
Therefore there is no clear international obligation on states to give judicial protection within 
their domestic courts to social and economic rights. States have a duty only to progressively 
realise these rights, and this obligation is not sufficiently clear to place any positive obligation 
on the state. Even where a state does not have a programme in place to progressively realise 
these rights there is little than can be done about it. The only power that the Committee has is 
to “name and shame” the violators through publishing their reports, but without a clear 
                                                          
15 Part II article 2 of ICESCR 
16 Henry Steiner, Ryan Goodman and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context; Law Politics 
Morals, 3rd Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007 p 275 
17 ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17 of 28th May 1985 
18 To date the Committee has released 33 General Comments 
19 For example General Comment 8 on the Right to Water is strengthened by a number of other convention aside 
from the ICESRC including The Watercourse Convention 1997, The Convention on Biological Diversity 1992, 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990, Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
against Women1979, Geneva Conventions on treatment of prisoners 
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international consensus that these rights should be given the status of rights, the reports do little 
to sway the position. Given that the international community has historically been dominated 
by western powers who opposed the inclusion of these rights from the beginning, it is 
unsurprising that the position has been slow to change.  
While the United Nations formally recognise the interdependent nature of the two sets of rights, 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights note that “the international community 
as a whole continue to tolerate all too often breaches of economic, social and cultural rights 
which, if they incurred in relation to civil and political rights, would provoke expressions of 
horror and outrage and would lead to concerted calls for immediate remedial action”.20  
Part of the reason for social and economic rights being classed as lesser rights is the wording 
and non enforceability of the Covenant. The only obligation which is placed on states is that 
they take steps “with a view to achieve progressively the full realisation of the rights” and thus 
leaves states with a wide margin of appreciation on how to implement the right.21  
When the Committee was established in it had three main objectives; to develop the normative 
content of the rights, to develop state benchmarks and to hold states accountable. States are 
required to submit reports to the Committee every five years which should document the steps 
taken to progressively realise. However the report may be tainted by political bias, and the 
Committee therefore allow shadow reports from NGO’s which may held the Committee obtain 
a fuller picture.  
Once a report is submitted to the Committee, the Committee makes concluding remarks to the 
State which contains recommendations on further implementation. The Committee has no 
power to enforce any of its recommendations.     
As a result of the lack of any enforcement mechanism and the emerging trend in national 
jurisdictions to protect social and economic rights, from 1990 the Committee began calling for 
the introduction of an optional protocol which would allow individuals to bring a claim against 
states for breaches of social and economic rights. Melish argues that this would allow the 
Committee to offer more effective protection in instances of concrete abuse, offer more 
                                                          
20 Committee statement to the World Conference, UN Doc E/1993/22 at 83 
21 Article 2(1) of ICESCR 
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definitive guidance on interpretation of rights and increase the stature afforded to the 
Covenant.22   
Following over a decade of discussions and negotiations, in June 2008 the protocol was 
approved by the Human Rights Council and was adopted by the General Assembly and opened 
for signature in December 2008. The protocol establishes a right of individual petition to the 
Committee where a state who has signed the protocol has breached the rights contained within 
the Covenant. The protocol expressly provides that the Committee may request interim 
measures to protect individuals and obliges states to ensure that the individual is not subjected 
to any form of adverse treatment as a result of the complaint. It allows for petitions from 
individuals, groups and other states who consider a state to be in breach of their obligation. It 
does require that all domestic remedies be exhausted before communication is sent to the 
Committee. The Committee however is not a Court. It makes a determination, following an 
enquiry in certain instances, and makes recommendations on its decision. It invites the State to 
engage with the process and requests that the state take measures to comply with its 
recommendations. There are no sanctions which can attach to a state for failure to comply and 
who persistently breach the rights.  
The optional protocol was scheduled come into force three months after the 10th ratification 
and as such entered into force on the 5th May 2013.23  
In Ireland the previous government took a stance of steadfast refusal when the issue of signing 
and ratifying the optional protocol was raised. This is reflective of the stance taken in Ireland 
to deny judicial protection to social and economic rights and the preference to determine issues 
relating to the distribution of resources within the exclusive competence of the Executive. 
However following pressure from the Irish Human Rights Council among others, on 21st 
February 2012 Tanaiste Eamonn Gilmore announced Ireland’s intention to sign the optional 
protocol.24 The Optional Protocol was signed on 23rd March 2012. There was no mention of 
the ratification of the optional protocol into Irish Law, and the current position is that the 
Optional Protocol still has not been ratified by Ireland. 
                                                          
22 Melish Tara, Introductory Note to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights, 48 ILM 256 (2009) 
23 As of March 2013 42 Countries have signed the optional protocol and 10 have ratified 
24Details of announcement available at www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=87596 accessed May 2013 
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Melish believes that the optional protocol’s most significant contribution will be opening the 
door to a more concerted public debate over the protection of social and economic rights and 
the public policies that affect them.25  
 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN IRELAND 
 
The optional protocol is particularly significant in Ireland as it has been one of the nations 
which have to date vehemently resisted any attempt to make social and economic rights 
justiciable within the domestic courts and refuse to grant them any form of constitutional or 
judicial protection. The only mention of social and economic rights in the Irish Constitution 
can be found within Art 45, the Directives of Social Policy. This is the non justiciable article 
of the Constitution which means that one cannot seek a remedy for a breach of any right 
contained within this article. The Court has stated that while the article itself is not justiciable, 
it can have regard to its provisions in interpreting another right.26 Despite this assertion, the 
use of Art 45 as an interpretive tool has been restricted principally to cases which involve 
employment and property rights.  
O’Dowd believes that despite the fact that there are no explicit provisions for the protection of 
social and economic rights that there is a wide scope for indirect protection.27 This indirect 
protection could have been given by the Courts linking a socio-economic right as a corollary 
to an existing protected right as has been done in the Indian Courts and Canadian Courts which 
have effectively expanded the right to life to include social and economic rights.28 Cases such 
as Peoples Union of Civil Liberties v Union of India have taken the non justiciable social and 
economic rights and made them justiciable by expansively interpreting the right to life, thus 
making the right to food a corollary to the right to life and as such justiciable.29   
                                                          
25 Melish Tara, Introductory Note to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights, 48 ILM 256 (2009) 
26 Dicta of Kenny J in Murtagh Properties v Cleary [1972] IR 330 
27 John T O’Dowd, Economic Social and Cultural Rights, Irish Human Rights Commission, 9th December 2005 
28 The directives of social policy in the Indian Constitution (Art 37) was inspired by Art 45 of the Irish 
Constitution 
29 PUCL v Union of India1997 AIR (SC)568 
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However despite the fact that such a scope that may exist, the Courts have resisted expanding 
the constitutional protection to encompass social and economic rights.  
In O’Reilly v Limerick Corporation Costello J held that these rights involved distributive justice 
which is concerned with distributing and allocating common goods and burdens and that 
distribution can only be made by those charged with furthering the common good.30 Essentially 
Costello J was setting the precedent that any claim which would involve the distribution of 
resources was a matter for the Government and not the Courts. While Costello J eventually 
over ruled this position in a later judgement in O’Brien v Wicklow UDC, the majority of the 
Supreme Court have echoed his earlier position in their decisions relating to the enforceability 
of social and economic rights.31 
The place of the social and economic rights within the Irish Constitution and the protection 
which the Courts will and can afford to these rights has been at the forefront of a litany of the 
cases. The High Court in DB v Minister for Justice Kelly J considered social and economic 
rights in a case involving the need for secure accommodation for minors.32 The High Court 
considered that it had jurisdiction to order the Government implement policy where it was 
necessary to vindicate the personal rights of the citizen. The Court stated that they would not 
undertake making such an order unless absolutely necessary with respect to the Separation of 
Powers Doctrine. Kelly J referred to the previous case of FN v Minister for Education where 
Geoghegan J held that the state had a responsibility to ensure as soon as practicable that 
arrangements were made for secure accommodation33 and also on the dicta of Hamilton CJ in 
DG v Eastern Health Board where it was stated that the Court had jurisdiction to take all 
measures to ensure that rights are vindicated.34 The Court in FN did not grant the injunction on 
the basis that once it had been identified as breaching the constitutional rights that it was 
expected that other organs of the state would respond in a timely fashion.35 
Having regard to the previous decisions in FN and DG, Kelly J held that the obligation on the 
part of the state had been identified previously and the Minister had still not made provision 
                                                          
30 [1989] ILRM 181 
31 Unrep High Court June 10 1994. Costello J confirmed that his original decision in O’Reilly was based on law 
that was not in force at the time of his Judgement. He concluded that similar conditions in O’Brien breached the 
right to bodily integrity. 
32 [1999] 1 ILRM 93 
33 [1995] 1 IR 409 
34 [1997] 3 IR 511 
35 Geoghegan J based this on the Judgement of the Supreme Court in McMenamin v Ireland [1996] 3 IR 100 
where the Court declined to grant the order on the basis that as the injustice had been recognised the 
Government would rectify such timeously.  
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for secure places for minors. His decision incorporates the facts that the right had been declared 
in previous cases, as had the responsibility of the Government, to vindicate that right and that 
the failure on the part of the Government, to vindicate the rights of the Plaintiff and those others 
affected by the failure, resulted in an Order compelling the Minister to complete the facilities 
within a certain timeline 
This case represented what seemed like a turning point in the vindication of social and 
economic rights and was welcomed by many commentators. Ruane observes that without the 
Order made by the High Court and in the face of ongoing procrastination it is difficult to see 
how the Plaintiffs and others in their situation would have obtained any meaningful relief.36The 
decision was welcomed greatly by many supporters of social rights being made justiciable as 
it essentially created the position whereby Courts could and would order the government to 
take positive measures to remedy a breach of rights even where these rights could be classed 
as social and economic rights.  
The impact of this decision however was short lived. In TD v Minister for Education the 
Supreme Court were charged with deciding an appeal from the High Court where an Order was 
given compelling the government to build and open residences for troubled children.37 The 
majority of the Court held that by granting such an order that it was breaching the separation 
of powers. Notwithstanding that Costello J recanted his position in O’Donnell v Limerick 
County Council that the Courts should not be involved in distributive justice and as such 
resource based issues were a matter solely for the Oireachtas, the majority of the Supreme 
Court upheld his previous reasoning.38 Keane CJ doubted as to whether the Courts should 
declare “what are frequently described as socio-economic rights” as unspecified rights under 
Article 45.39  
Murray J also confirmed that there is no obligation on the state to provide, or on a citizen to 
receive medical and social services as a constitutional obligation. Murray J went further to state 
that the failure to include social and economic rights in the various referenda showed a 
conscious decision to exclude them from constitutional protection.40 Murray J reaffirmed his 
position in relation to social and economic rights in North Western Health Board v HW where 
                                                          
36 Blathna Ruane B.L, Grant of Mandatory Orders to enforce Constitutional Rights, The Bar Review, June 2000 
37 [2001] 4 IR 259 
38 [1989] ILRM 181. Recanted in O’Brien v Wicklow UDC unrep High Court June 10 1994 
39 [2001] 4 IR 259 
40 [2001] 4 IR 259 at 316-317 
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he stated that “there are no provisions of the Constitution Cognisable to the Courts expressly 
requiring or permitting the State to provide medical services or social welfare of any kind”.41 
The decision in TD v Minister for Education was not unanimous and in her dissenting 
judgement Denham J took the position that just because it had policy considerations and would 
require the executive spending money is not a reason to abdicate the responsibility of the Court 
in deciding the constitutionality of an issue.42 
 The Supreme Court is therefore saying that we don’t think that these rights exist as rights in 
the classic sense, but even if they do, they have no place within the Court and are matters for 
the executive as they involve the distribution of funds.  
The position then becomes that the Courts will not enforce socio-economic rights due to the 
separation of powers doctrine and, that in essence, the Courts cannot tell the government how 
to spend its money. This becomes somewhat of a loose argument, as if the State recognises 
socio-economic rights as rights, albeit in the international sphere, then the Courts have a duty 
to “defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen”.43 Recognition should not differ 
from the national and international spheres. If the state recognises rights as rights 
internationally then it should follow that those rights be protected internally. The dualistic 
nature of Ireland in the international sphere should not be used as an excuse to abdicate the 
protection of rights. Ireland has signed the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, thus explicitly 
confirming, internationally, that it in theory agrees that social and economic rights must be 
protected. Given that international declaration, it seems somewhat paradoxical that our Courts 
are failing to implement any form of judicial protection, and abdicating by using the separation 
of powers argument.   
Gerard Whyte argues that it is both constitutionally and politically acceptable for the Courts to 
adjudicate on social and economic rights as it forces the government to deal with issues of 
social exclusion which may otherwise remain ignored.44 A competing view was espoused by 
the Constitution Review Group who rejected calls to explicitly include socio-economic rights 
as it would require judges to rely on their own subjective views of poverty.45 Wall observes the 
                                                          
41 [2001] 3 IR 622 at 729 
42 [2002]4 IR 259 
43 Art 40.3.1 of the Irish Constitution 
44 Gerard White, Socio-Economic Rights in Ireland: Judicial and non judicial enforcement, IHRC Conference on 
Social Economic and Cultural Rights, 9 December 2005. 
45 Constitution Review Group, 1994, p235 
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absurdity of this argument as interpretations based on the “reasonable man” are left to Judges 
to determine on a daily basis, yet the Review Group does not believe that a Judge is capable of 
defining an unacceptable level of poverty.46 Wall’s observation is particularly astute, and it 
appears to be another excuse for not granting adequate legal status to social and economic right.  
The position espoused by certain Supreme Court Judges that judicial activism in the realm of 
social and economic rights is undemocratic in nature and breaches the separation of powers has 
been met with much criticism. Firstly, as noted above, the Court has been activist in developing 
the unspecified rights in Article 45. Further as Langwallner observes, this argument is 
misplaced as the Supreme Court is vested with the power of supreme legislator in all matters 
constitutional and can therefore be enforced against state action or inaction as the case may 
be.47 Langwallner’s argument is the more logical and persuasive and compounds the view that 
the decisions are being taken on a policy basis and that the separation of powers doctrine is 
used as nothing more than an excuse to continue to deny the protection of social and economic 
rights. Speaking of the role of the Judiciary in protecting human rights, Barak in the Isreali 
Supreme Court believes that judicial activism is necessary as human rights are too important 
and precious to be left to the Executive and Legislature alone.48  
Further, as Wall notes, if one takes the separation of powers doctrine to its most extreme, none 
of the rights contained within the constitution can be guaranteed as they all require an element 
of judicial examination of executive spending.49 This doctrine is not invoked when one is 
dealing with breaches of civil and political rights and rather is only used for a legitimate 
dismissal of social and economic rights. Given that the distinction between the two sets of 
rights is political and not judicial in nature, there position take by the Court is illogical.  
In the majority of the cases cited above, the judges refer to the fact that the only socio-economic 
right that is given constitutional protection is the right to education as it is expressly provided 
for.50 There is doubt whether the framers of the Constitution realised the importance of 
providing for education and whether it was included based on historical reasons that while 
                                                          
46 Wall Illan, The Aspirational Nature of Social and Economic Rights, An Examination of an unsound case, the 
logistical and factual misconception of rights, [2004] Cork Online Law Review 1 
47 Langwallner David, Separation of Powers, Judicial Deference and the Failure to Protect the Rights of the 
Individual, Carolan Eoin and Doyle Oran (ed), The Irish Constitution: Governance and Values, Thompson 
Roundhall, Dublin 2008 
48 Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: the role of a Supreme Court in Democracy, 116 Harvard Law Review 19 
2002-2003 
49 Wall Illan, The Aspirational Nature of Social and Economic Rights, An Examination of an unsound case, the 
logistical and factual misconception of rights, [2004] Cork Online Law Review 1 
50 The Right to Education is provided for in Article 42 of the Constitution 
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Ireland was a colony of England there was severe restrictions on the Irish being educated. 
Regardless of the reasoning behind the inclusion, the Courts have accepted that the right to 
education is one that is capable of being protected and enforced by the Courts.51 Having noted 
that the Courts accept the right to education as the only socio-economic right in which it can 
intervene, the level of protection which it has been given by the Courts warrants an 
examination.  
In O’Donoghue v Minister for Health the Government argued that it was not obliged to provide 
primary education for mentally disabled children and that the obligation conferred by the 
Constitution was for scholastic primary education and not special needs education.52 The Court 
disagreed and O’Hanlon J held that the obligation was to provide basic elementary education 
to all children to enable them make the best use of their inherent potential capabilities, however 
limited they may be. The Learned Judge made a number of recommendations to the State in 
relation to their obligation to provide for primary education to those suffering from severe 
disabilities, one of which being that the right to free primary education may persist beyond that 
of children who do not suffer from such disabilities.53 
It was the extent of the obligation that was at the core of the case of Sinnott v Minister for 
Education.54 Mr Sinnott was an autistic man who claimed that he was entitled to free primary 
education for as long as he could benefit from it. Barr J in the High Court agreed and held that 
the right to education was need based and not age based. The State appealed this ruling to the 
Supreme Court.55 Counsel for Mt Sinnott argued that Article 42 was the only article in the 
Constitution which required the state expressly to spend money on a social objective and 
further that this requirement was not subjected to any implied restriction.56 The Majority of the 
Supreme Court found in favour of the State with Hardiman J concluding that by reading the 
education clause which provides that the parents be the primary educator of the child and 
concludes that “this appears to me plainly to involve the consequence that the recipient of 
primary education would be a person who is not an adult and in respect of whom the primary 
educator, according to the natural order, is his family”.57 Hardiman J referred to the writings 
                                                          
51 The right was first mentioned as being judicially enforceable in Byrne v Ireland [1972]  IR 241 
52 [1996] 2 IR 20 
53 Hogan & Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, 4th Ed, Tottel Publishing, Dublin 2004, pg 1955 
54 [2001] 2 IR 545 
55 The State did concede that the Mr Sinnott’s rights up to the age of 18 had been violated and they did not 
appeal the award of damages. Their appeal was solely based on the aspect which would require them to provide 
life long primary education in certain circumstances. 
56 [2001] 2 IR 545 at para 52 
57 [2001] 2 IR 545 
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of Professor Kelly on the interpretation of Art 42 in stating that primary education extending 
for life was not something within the minds of the framers of the Constitution.58Accordingly 
the entitlement to free primary education ends when one reaches the age of 18. 
Doyle is critical of Hardiman’s reasoning and states that a parent does not stop being a parent, 
nor a child stop being a child once the age of 18 is attained and further that there is nothing to 
support the contention that a child must be interpreted to mean a non adult.59 
Keane CJ was the only judge in the Supreme Court who dissented on this case and expressly 
approved of the High Court reasoning that education was need related and not age related. The 
judgment took account only of the chronological age of the Plaintiff and not his mental age. As 
he was, for all intents and purposes, still a child dependent on his parents to meet his daily 
needs and the education which he sought was equated to that of primary education it would 
appear that the State has failed to vindicate his rights. Doyle observes that the lack of consistent 
interpretation of the Constitution by the Court resulted in a policy decision being made whereby 
the Judges interpreted it to the way that they felt the outcome should be and that by taking 
another interpretation could have afforded legitimacy to Mr Sinnott’s claim.60 
While the majority of the reasoning in the Supreme Court centred around the age at which 
primary education ceases to be a right by reference to the wording of the Article in question 
and the relevant legislation, Hardiman J indulged in discussion the separation of powers issue 
which has been utilised to deny legitimacy to countless claims for relief in relation to social 
and economic rights: 
 Decisions of this sort are normally a matter for the legislative and executive arms of 
government. This is not merely a matter of demarcation or administrative convenience. It is a 
reflection of the constitutionally mandated division of the general powers of Government, set 
out in Article 6 of the Constitution. A system of Separation of Powers of this sort is a part of 
the constitutional arrangements of all free societies.61 
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Having analysed the decision of Costello J in O’Reilly v Limerick Corporation62, Hardiman J 
noted that the High Court Order described the type and implementation of education that Mr 
Sinnott should have by way of Mandatory Order breached the separation of powers. Hardiman 
J implicitly approved the Judgement of Costello J which provides 
 In exercising this function the Court would not be administering justice as it does when 
determining an issue relating to commutative justice but it would be engaging in an entirely 
different exercise namely an adjudication on the fairness or otherwise of the manner in which 
other organs of the state had administered public resources.63 
Despite the Courts having referred multiple time to the fact that education is the only socio-
economic right which the Court can and will protect and vindicate, the position as set out in 
the Sinnott case is that education, despite what disabilities a person may be suffering from 
which may render them in childlike state for life, will cease to be an obligation on the State 
from the age of 18. This position is clearly unsatisfactory for those with special needs who still 
require primary education after the age of majority. Further, despite the protection given to 
education in the constitution its protection is implemented depending on available resources. 
The Education for Persons with Special Needs Act 2004 was passed but still has not been fully 
implemented and with the economic downturn three successive budgets have seen cuts which 
impact severely upon the quality of education being received by those with special needs.   
In discussing the discrimination which exists in the Irish Education System Friel asks what 
lessons Ireland can learn from the case of Brown v Board of Education64 and concludes that 
despite no overt signs of discrimination, covert discrimination is ever present and, further, he 
cautions that until there is a case of comparable magnitude in the Irish Jurisdiction the full 
impact of it will not be felt.65 This is an interesting comparison to draw, but an apt one 
nonetheless. Ireland had an opportunity to do more than pay mere lip service to the concept of 
non discrimination but instead created discrimination in more covert ways than based on race. 
Education was from the beginning at the heart of this discrimination. Friel observes that from 
the beginning of the constitution the strong hand of Catholicism can be seen “curled into a fist 
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of oppression against those who disagree with it”.66 As the church had been the main educator 
and provider of schools in the Ireland those who were not catholic did not receive the same 
level of education. This position has evolved where religion is not a bar to entering most 
schools, however disability has taken its place and the Courts are not willing to entertain 
substantive equality for persons with disability in education.  
It can be seen from the cases above that the right to education as the sole social and economic 
right upon which the courts can adjudicate on, has been interpreted in the most restrictive 
manner whereby substantive protection is not afforded and has resulted in becoming fraught 
with discrimination.  
Thus the position in Ireland is that there is a basic right to primary education which ends at the 
age of 18 and which in many cases is not suitable to those with severe mental disabilities.67 
The remainder of social and economic rights are not justiciable and the Court will not entertain 
any claim to have them enforced or vindicated. The right to housing, food, clothing, healthcare, 
shelter, warmth, social security and the all encompassing rights to an adequate standard of 
living and to live with dignity are left to the policy makers to be implemented progressively, 
subject to resources.68  
The statistics show a widening gap between the rich and the poor and the inequality which 
exists in society. The policy decisions serve only to compound marginalisation of the already 
marginalised members of society. The need to give meaningful protection to social and 
economic rights is highlighted in the extreme by the statistics released from the Central 
Statistics Office. With the Courts thus far resisting any attempt to make the rights justiciable 
through the Constitution and deferring to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, is the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights the way 
forward for meaningful protection in Ireland?  
A potential new development for social and economic rights with particular relevance to 
children is currently underway. On Saturday 10th November 2012 the Irish Electorate went to 
the polls and voted on “The Children’s Referendum”. This referendum was passed by a slight 
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majority. The referendum was to remove the existing Article 42.5 of the Constitution and to 
replace it with the new Article 42A.  
 
The New Article 42A.1 firstly establishes that: 
The State recognises and affirms the natural and imprescriptible rights of all children and 
shall, as far as practicable, by its laws protect and vindicate those rights. 
The most interesting part of the new Article 42A is Section 2.1 which potentially paves the 
way for social and economic rights to become justiciable in Ireland, at least for child litigants.  
It states 
 In exceptional cases, where the parents, regardless of their marital status fail in their 
duty towards their children to such extent that the safety or welfare of any of their children is 
likely to be prejudicially affected, the State as guardian of the common good shall, by 
proportionate means provided by law, endeavour to supply the place of the parents, but always 
with due regard to the natural and imprescriptible rights of the child. 
 
This article does not elaborate on the circumstances in which parents could “fail in their duty 
towards their children” and arguably this raises the point that where parents do not have the 
financial wherewithal to feed and clothe their children that the state is in fact placing a positive 
obligation on itself to intervene, albeit by proportionate means. It is accepted that this may not 
have been the intention of the drafters to have the article construed in such a manner, however 
it leaves the possibility open.  
It further opens the possibility of the State facing action where it fails to act. Slapper in his 
article suggests that the criminal law, liability for omissions should be extended to the State.69 
His article exclusively speaks of elderly citizens who perish as a result of the State failure to 
ensure adequate allowances for heat and food during winter months, what he terms spreadsheet 
manslaughter, however the same principal could potentially apply in relation to children’s 
rights within the new Article 42A.  
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Should the Article be interpreted as having social and economic connotations and placing a 
positive obligation on the State to take the place of the parents in providing for the child, food, 
heat, clothing, water, there then leaves open the potential for these rights to become justiciable 
under the Constitution.  
Granted, at this point the above is mere speculation as the Article has just been approved by 
the Voters of Ireland and there is yet to be any legal determination on its interpretation. If the 
Supreme Court interpret this Article widely enough and allow social and economic rights to 
form part of it, this article could further exponentially the status of social and economic rights 
within the domestic sphere. 
 
THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL AND IRELAND 
 
Ireland signed up to the Covenant in 1973 and ratified it in 1989. Ireland entered only two 
reservations to the Covenant, in relation to fostering policy to promote the Irish language and 
to safeguard parent’s rights to educate their children in the home.70 Despite this, the wording 
of the Covenant, as already discussed is problematic. It does not place immediate and positive 
obligations on the state to vindicate breaches of social and economic rights. The concept of 
progressive realisation subject to resources of the state renders the provisions effectively 
meaningless and devoid of impact. Steiner and Alston observe that such wording gives states 
the opportunity to present themselves as defenders of social and economic rights without any 
precise constraints over their behaviour.71 
The Committee on Social Economic and Cultural Rights were tasked with monitoring 
compliance with the Covenant by way of periodical reporting facilities. It makes 
recommendations and criticisms of the way the rights have been implemented but have no 
power to enforce their decisions. As a result of the widespread criticism of the place of social 
and economic rights within International Law preparations for the optional protocol began. The 
reasons behind the optional protocol are multifaceted and centre on the impetus of the 
international community recognising the severity of the breaches of social and economic rights 
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which existed outside third world countries. Many believe that extreme poverty exists only in 
war torn, famine infested nations and are ignorant of the severity of poverty within many of 
the more powerful western democracies. Further, the fact that many nations are beginning to 
expressly include judicial protection for social and economic rights, such as the South African 
Constitution72 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Right73 and other nations who 
had hitherto not expressly protected them were beginning to expansively interpret other rights 
to give meaningful protection.74 The combination of these factors among others left the 
international community with no option but to increase the protection of social and economic 
rights and elevate their status in international law terms.  
The divide between the two sets of rights was apparent at the outset of negotiations where 
delegates argued that a complaints mechanism would be impractical given the imprecise nature 
of the rights contained within the Covenant, expressed concerns that poorer states would be 
targeted for these claims and that such a complaints procedure would undermine democracy in 
policy and budgetary matters.75 By the fourth meeting of the Committee on the optional 
protocol some nations were still against the concept of a complaints mechanism stressing that 
social and economic rights were rights to be implemented progressively and as such it was not 
appropriate to grant them legal or quasi legal status.76 The lack of clear international consensus 
on the precise extent of protection which should be afforded, and the legal status of social and 
economic rights have led to a somewhat weak optional protocol being adopted.  
As a result of this, the final draft of the Optional Protocol gives very little practical 
enforceability to social and economic rights. There are three main reasons why the optional 
protocol will result in little meaningful change to the status of social and economic rights within 
the Irish jurisdiction. 
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Firstly the wording of the treaty itself remains the same, that being that rights, according to the 
Covenant are to be recognised subject to the availability of resources and rather than an 
immediate obligation to ensure rights, this category of rights are to be progressively realised.77 
Neither the treaty nor the protocol has been expanded on what the definition of this is to mean. 
Therefore as there is no definitive definition on what the obligations are, it will be an 
exceedingly difficult task to show that a state has breached these obligations. It would appear 
that once a state can show that it has a plan or has done some work in some way to implement 
and protect the right then it will not be found to have breached its obligations. It would seem 
that only where there is a complete denial of one of the rights that the Committee will be able 
to definitively say that the state has breached its obligations. As the optional protocol has not 
yet come into force it is unclear just how the Committee will interpret the Convention and to 
what extent the general comments will impact on this interpretation.   
The second issue relates to the powers conferred by the optional protocol on the Commission. 
The Commission is empowered to receive communications from individuals and make a 
determination on the case. The Commission however is not a Court and as such does not have 
the same enforcement powers of a Court. The Commissions powers extend to making 
recommendations, they have no power to enforce their decisions or to impose sanctions on the 
offending State. For example, the optional protocol allows the Commission to take interim 
measures after the communication has been received. This extends to the Commission 
transmitted a request for the urgent attention of the State to put measures in place.78 They then 
invite the parties to reach a friendly settlement.79 Should friendly settlement not be reached the 
Commission will examine the complaint and make recommendations on same, requiring only 
that the State party give due consideration to the views of the Commission.80 At no point is the 
Commission given any enforcement power and it does not place any positive obligations on 
the State.  
While it is undoubtedly a positive move to create an international forum where breaches of 
social and economic rights can be decided upon, the failure to change the wording of the initial 
treaty coupled with the weak powers conferred on the Commission result in little practical 
change. The system relies on political cooperation and pressure to protect the rights, however 
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where a State fails to comply with the views of the Commission there is nothing that can be 
done to enforce those views. The optional protocol also allows States to denounce it at any time 
by giving notice in writing.81 Thus where a State does not wish to implement the 
recommendations of the Commission it may simply opt out of the protocol.  
The third issue which arises is the dualistic nature of Ireland’s system. International law does 
not become part of domestic law unless and until it has been transposed into national law either 
by way of legislation or constitutional amendment. A constitutional amendment was inserted 
in order that laws of the European Union could have direct effect in Ireland without the need 
for a new referendum or legislation each time. This amendment is specific to European Union 
Law only and does not have applicability to the wider area of international law. Therefore in 
order for international law to become part of domestic law and to be relied upon in domestic 
courts it must have been transposed into national law. Any international law or treaty to which 
the State signs up to, only binds them internationally and not domestically and as such cannot 
be relied upon in Irish Courts. This position was made clear in the case of Kavanagh v Governor 
of Mountjoy Prison where the Supreme Court stated in no uncertain terms that the provisions 
of the ICCPR bound the state internationally and could not be relied on in domestic courts 
without explicit incorporation into national law.82 This therefore creates a situation whereby 
an individual could potentially bring a complaint against Ireland to the Commission who find 
that the State has breached their obligations under the Convention and then be faced with the 
reality that the State does not change its policy and ignores the recommendations of the 
Commission and further cannot bring the recommendations to the domestic Courts to have 
their rights vindicated.  
It would appear that due to these reasons the impact of the optional protocol will have very 
limited affect on the domestic position taken within Ireland. Becoming a signatory to the 
protocol is nothing more than paying lip service to the rights without garnering any real 
protection for them. The fact remains that these rights cost money and at a time where money 
is tight and budgets are severely restrained the last thing that the Irish Government wants is 
social and economic rights to be made enforceable.  
CONCLUSION 
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While the optional protocol is to be welcomed as a significant step forward for the recognition 
and protection of social and economic rights internationally, the provisions of the protocol are 
of such a weakened nature that they have little effect on the national systems which do not 
protect these rights. In order for meaningful protection for social and economic rights to 
become a reality, the first issue that needs to be addressed is the precise parameters of the rights. 
Without such a definitive description of the contents of the rights and the obligations on the 
part of the state it is practically impossible, save in the most blatant cases, to show that the state 
has breached its obligations under the Convention. Secondly the international community 
needs to establish an International Court where definitive rulings and sanctions can be meted 
out against states who breach their obligations. Where no sanctions can be meted out it feeds 
the perception that social and economic rights are not as important as civil and political rights 
and as such do not deserve the same level of protection. This perception is one that needs to be 
abolished and the opinion of the United Nations which espouses the interdependent nature of 
the rights needs to be promulgated.  
The situation at present simply put is that the state has an obligation to respect, protect and 
fulfil social and economic rights, although it does not have any definitive parameters or legally 
enforceable guidelines as to what that obligation actually entails. Should it refuse to grant 
meaningful protection and refuse to make social and economic rights justiciable, as in Ireland, 
hitherto there has been absolutely nothing that a person could do to vindicate their rights. The 
optional protocol does change that position by providing a forum whereby a person can bring 
their petition, but the lack of enforceability and sanctions renders the process almost worthless.  
The diluted powers contained within the optional protocol are evidence of the fact that social 
and economic rights are still viewed as second generation rights which do not deserve the same 
protection as civil and political rights. Until this divide between the rights is bridged it will be 
an exceedingly difficult task for social and economic rights to garner meaningful protection 
within the international community.  
  
